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Introduction
Copyright law governs "access to the culture of our society in all
its aspects-social, political, economic, educational, and artistic."'
However, the average music listener is oblivious to the intricacies of

copyright law.2 She can purchase her compact discs or listen to her
favorite songs on the radio without knowing anything about the
United States copyright system. Questions such as whether the music
has copyright protection, or who owns the copyright, probably never
cross her mind.4

Unbeknownst to these typical music listeners, the nation's
legislators have been debating whether the duration of copyright
protection, currently life of the author plus fifty years, 5 should be
extended another 20 years. 6 As one commentator has observed, "the
. [have been] drawn" 7 over the "Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1995. "8 "Music Row" 9 is on one side, fighting to
battle lines

.

1. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
USERS' RIGHTS 5 (1991).
2. See Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 238-39 (1991)
[hereinafter Litman, Myth] (discussing her impression of the public's perception of the copyright
system).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The 1976 Copyright Act provides: "Copyright in a work created on or after January 1,
1978, subsists from its creation and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and fifty years after the author's death." Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572
(codified as amended), 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
6. The Copyright Term Extension Act, Hearings on S. 483 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)[hereinafter 1995 Senate Hearings] (statement of Senator
Orrin Hatch).
7. Beverly Keel, Making Their Voices Heard: Music Row Takes on Legislative Battles to
Preserve Songwriters' Rights, NASHVILLE BANNER, Oct. 11, 1995, at Dl.
8. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995 is the popular name for the proposed bills,
H.R. 989 and S. 483. H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
Representative Carlos Moorhead introduced H.R. 989 on February 16, 1995, and the legislation
remains pending before the House Judiciary Committee. U.S. Billtrack on WL 1995 U.S. H.B.
989; 52 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 283 (July 11, 1996). Likewise, Senator Orrin
Hatch introduced S. 483, an identical bill, on March 2, 1995. The Senate Judiciary Committee
approved the legislation on May 23, 1996, "after a protracted but unsuccessful attempt . . . to
add language that would address music licensing complaints by small businesses and religious
broadcasters." Legislation: Copyright Term Extension Bill is Approved by Senate Committee, 52
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 137 (May 30,1996).
9. The term "Music Row" encompasses the songwriting community-songwriters,
publishers, and performance rights organizations. See generally Keel, supra note 7.
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extend songwriters' rights,' ° and the legal academic community" is on

the other, fighting to preserve a strong "public domain."'' Both sides
have expressed their views on the proposed legislation in
Congressional committtee hearings.13 However, despite the adverse
effects that the extension could have on the public,14 it has not
garnered much public attention over the past two years.

5

10. Songwriters, such as Bob Dylan, Quincy Jones, and Don Henley, and the heirs of
creators, such as Irving Berlin's daughter, Mary Ellen Barrett, testified before the Congressional
committees to show their support of S.483 and H.R. 989. In fact, testimony and prepared
statements from songwriters, their heirs, and music industry representatives comprised the bulk
of testimony offered in favor of the proposed legislation. Songwriters argue that they are entitled
to the twenty year extension of copyright protection. As products of their creative efforts, their
songs are property and deserve the same protection given any other property. Accordingly, they
deserve the economic and artistic protection that the proposed legislation would afford. Heirs
argue that their relatives wrote songs or musical compositions to support themselves and to
provide financial benefits to future generations. They also claim that authors will suffer when
commercially viable works fall into the public domain. See 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6
(statements of Don Henley and Bob Dylan); Copyright Term, Film Labeling and Film
Preservation Legislation: The Copyright Term Extension Act, Hearings on H.R. 989 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 272-73, 237-39 (1995)[hereinafter 1995 House Hearings](statements of Mary Ellin
Barrett and Quincy Jones).
11. See 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi); 1995 House
Hearings,supra note 10, at 292-308 (statement of Professor Dennis S. Karjala, representing the
United States Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors). Historically, the academic
community has focused on the benefits of the public domain. See generally Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990)[hereinafter Litman, Domain] (arguing that a strong
public domain is the best way to promote the enterprise of authorship); David Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (Autumn 1981)(arguing that
increasing recognition of new intellectual property interests requires a corresponding increase in
recognition of individual rights in the public domain).
12. In brief, the "public domain" consists of all the works which are no longer eligible for
copyright protection. It is an "informational commons which is free (at least insofar as copyright
law is concerned) to all users and all uses . . . . [Ilt is the source to which creators of each
generation turn for the materials that they refashion into new . . .works of imagination." 1995
Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi); See also Litman, Domain,
supra note 11, at 975-76.
13. See generally 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6; 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10;
Joyce Price, Songwriters Want Copyright Law in Tune with Laws Overseas: Adding Twenty Years
would Bolster Economy, Backers Say, WASH. TIMES, November 1, 1995, at A2; Keel, supra note
7.
14. See 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi) (discussing
the negative impact that the proposed legislation would have on the public by restricting access
to works).
15. The publicity has been sparse due to the nature and strength of the special interests
involved. The introduction, necessity, and status of "The Copyright Term Extension Act" has
been covered primarily in the technical journals and music industry trade magazines as opposed
to the general press that the public follows. See generally Legislation:House Panel Set to Consider
Omnibus Copyright Measure, 52 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 120 (May 23, 1996);
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The Copyright Term Extension Act represents the first legislative
attempt to increase the duration of copyright protection since the
Copyright Act of 1976. Consequently, much of the debate over the
Copyright Term Extension Act centers around the propriety and
necessity of another extension. Essentially, this debate
raises the
16
question: "how long should copyright protection last?,
This Note argues that, while history has shown that there is no
easy answer to the question of copyright duration, the proposed
extension to life of the author plus seventy years is too long.17 The

Copyright Term Extension Act is special interest legislation that
mistakenly emphasizes differences in the duration of protection
afforded to copyright holders as opposed to the quality of protection
between the United Sates and Europe. Since many of the proponents
of this legislation come from the "music industry,"18 Part I of this Note

provides background information regarding copyrights in this context.
Part II examines the history of United States' copyright law and
focuses in particular upon the 1976 Act.1 9 Part III identifies and
discusses international copyright agreements, such as the Berne

Convention,' the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC),2' and the

Bill Holland, Clinton Supports Copyright Extension, BILLBOARD, Sept. 30, 1995 (reporting the
Clinton administration's support of the proposed extension of copyright protection); Copyright
Term Extension Bill Introduced in the U.S. Congress, ONLINE LIBRARIES & MICROCOMPUTERS,
April 1995, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File (reporting the introduction of S. 483
and H.R. 989 and referring people to the Congressional Record for additional information).
16. Saul Cohen, Duration, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1180, (1977) (discussing this basic question in
the context of the 1976 Copyright Act's new term of copyright protection: life of the author plus
fifty years). Cohen states that, to be fair and reasonable, copyright protection should not
terminate during the life of the author. Id. at 1191. His ultimate conclusion is that "[O]n balance,
a term of life plus twenty years seems to [him] to be fair and not unreasonable, a term of life plus
fifty years seems to [him] to be fair and not unreasonable." Id. at 1192. His reasoning and
analysis seem to suggest that at some point after the life of the author the term of protection can
be limited without being unfair.
17. Congress can protect authors' exclusive rights only for limited times. U.S. Const. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8.
18. The phrase "music industry" is used in the broadest sense to include the authors or
songwriters, lyricists, heirs, authors' rights associations, record companies, and music publishing
companies. See infra text accompanying notes 25-38.
19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
20. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter "Berne Convention,"
"Berne," or "the Berne"].
21. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised,
Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
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EC Duration Directive,' which affect American copyright holders.'

Part IV examines the arguments for and against the Copyright Term
Extension Act. Finally, Part V concludes that the proposed legislation
is not within the United States copyright tradition.

I
Copyrights in the Music Industry
Many people are involved in the creation, performance, and
ultimate dissemination of a popular song. "Because copyright is
divisible, . . . the different rights in the copyright bundle can be, and

often are, owned or controlled by different entities."' Consequently,
ownership of the various copyrightable interests involved is often
difficult to ascertain.
2
Copyright of eligible works of authorship, such as musical works 5
and sound recordings,2 vests automatically in the author once the
work has been "fixed in any tangible medium of expression ...."27
2
Several separate copyrightable interests exist in most musical works. 8
For example, copyright protection for musical works "encompasses
both the words of a song as well as its instrumental component. A

22. Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 [hereinafter EC Duration Directive]
(harmonizing the term of protection for copyright and certain related rights). See also 1995
Senate Hearings (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch)(discussing the necessity of an increase in
U.S. copyright protection to effectively combat the implementation of the EC Duration
Directive).
23. The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade's (GAT) Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have also sought to harmonize the duration and extent of
copyright protection amongst TRIPs member countries. Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the
Duration of Copyright in the United States and European Union: Procedure and Policy, 6
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579, 583 (1996). However, because the EC Duration
Directive, with its new term, created new disharmony before the United States' implementing
legislation took effect, an extensive discussion of GATT and TRIPs is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a discussion of these provisions, see id. (arguing that the Copyright Term Extension
Act would decrease discrimination against U.S. authors and works and benefit the public).
24. Jessica Litman, The Herbert Tenzer Memorial Conference: Copyright in the Twenty First
Century: The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 31 n.14 (1994)
[hereinafter, Litman, Right to Read].
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1994).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994). "[S]ound recordings were granted federal copyright
protection for the first time" in 1971. Les Watkins, The Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, 13 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 1 (Winter 1996) "The legislative history of the
Sound Recordings Act of 1971 indicates that it had a narrow and specific purpose: to prevent
phonorecord piracy .... Id.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
28. DAVID NIMMER AND MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 24.01 (1996).
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musical work can be embodied in various material objects such as
musical notation on written paper or directly recorded on a
phonorecord."
There is also copyright protection for a sound
recording, which is essentially "a captured performance" of a musical
work.a While the musical work and the sound recording are
"independently copyrightable, . . . [the] sound recording is also a
derivative work based on a preexisting work, i.e., a
musical . . . [work]." 31

The confusion surrounding these two distinct copyright interests

"arises because both the musical . . . work [and the sound recording]

are embodied on the same material object, the phonorecord. ' 2 The
distinction between these two copyrights is important "because the
owner of a sound recording copyright enjoys different exclusive rights
than the copyright owner of the musica . . . work captured in the

sound recording."'

For example, "[t]he sound recording copyright

29. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 88 (1989).
30. Id. at 89.
31. Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing,and Compulsory Licensing: Toward a
Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 393-94 (1986).
32.

LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 88.

33. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106,114 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 106 provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.
Section 106 was recently amended to provide for the first time a very limited performance right
for sound recording copyright owners. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39 (Nov. 1, 1995). The amendment provides sound recording copyright
owners with the right to control public performance by digital transmission by a subscription
service or interactive service, as defined in the Act. It gives no performance rights in the context
of regular radio broadcasts.
Section 114, which addresses the limitations on the scope of the exclusive rights associated
with sound recording copyrights, was also recently amended by the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 to provide a limited right to control public performances. Musical
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confers no ownership right to either the material object or to the

underlying musical work."' Therefore, the scope of sound recording
copyrights, with respect to reproduction and adaptation, is limited to
the actual sounds that are recorded: a defendant in a copyright

infringement suit must mechanically reproduce or lift sounds directly
off the recording in order to be liable. 5 By contrast, in other
categories of copyrighted works, any form of copying or imitation will
infringe.'
The musical work and the sound recording copyrights are often
owned by different persons or entities, because while "[a]s a rule,
copyright ownership in the musical composition vests in its creators"
works copyright owners have more extensive rights to control the public performance of the
musical work. Section 114 provides in relevant part:
(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are limited to
the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not include any
right of performance under section 106(4).
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1)
of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of
phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly capture the actual sounds fixed in the
recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the
actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise
altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights . . . under clauses (1) and (2) of
section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording ....
(c) This section does not limit or impair the exclusive right to perform publicly, by
means of a phonorecord, any of the works specified by section 106(4).
17 U.S.C. § 114 (1994).
34. LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 89.
35. See generally id. at 217 (discussing limitations on exclusive rights afforded to sound
recordings under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)). See also Michael I. Rudell, Copyright, Musical
Composition and Sound Recording, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1994) (discussing a recent federal court
decision illustrating "the differences between the copyright protection available to the proprietor
of a musical composition and [of] a sound recording.").
36. Musical work copyright owners have substantially broader rights than do sound
recording copyright owners. For example, these copyright owners have always enjoyed the right
to control the public performance of the musical work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994). But section 115
does place "substantial limits on the reproduction, adaptation, and distribution rights of musical
copyright owners." LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 212. After the musical copyright owner has
distributed the musical work "to the public, any other person can make a sound recording of the
work for sale to the public." Id. See also ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 76 (1991). Section
115 prescribes the relationship between the musical copyright owner and the sound recorder
when the sound recorder chooses to utilize the compulsory licensing scheme as a means to
distribute its own independent recordings.
Section 115, also known as the mechanical license, provides in part: "In the case of
nondramatic musical works, the exclusive rights . . . to make and to distribute phonorecords of
such works, are subject to compulsory licensing.
... 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994).
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someone other than the creator of the music and lyrics often records

and distributes the musical composition pursuant to a contractual
arrangement which effects the creator's ownership and the right to
administer the copyright. Accordingly, it is important to remember
both the different copyrights and the contractual agreements
involved 38 when evaluating the validity of the arguments for and
against extending the duration of copyright protection.

II
American Copyright Law
A. Historical Origins
"American copyright law is unique for the purpose of copyright is
specifically stated in the U.S. Constitution."'39 The Framers, building
upon English philosophies' and colonial copyright laws,4 1 gave
37. NIMMER, supra note 28, at § 24.01. These contractual agreements may take many
different forms. Id. The composer or lyricist may enter into an agreement with a publishing entity
to exchange some or all of his/her rights regarding the musical composition in return for the
entity's handling of certain services such as copyright registration. Id.
The particular type of contractual relationship involved . . . will determine the
proprietorship of the copyright in the musical composition; the extent and nature of the
writer's power to control the use of the musical composition will also be a matter of
negotiation. The type of agreement usually is determined by the writer's leverage as
well as the economic terms offered by the publishing entity.
Id. Essentially, when "the copyrighted work is a popular song .. . the reproduction and
distribution rights are typically owned by a music publisher and licensed through [an agency such
as] the Harry Fox Agency to record companies, while the performance right is licensed through a
performing rights society like ASCAP." Litman, Right to Read, supra note 24, at 31 n.14. The
performance licensing agents represent and collect royalties for music copyright owners not
sound recording copyright owners.
38. The creators of the musical work often sell their rights in the work in return for the
ongoing royalty payments. They receive a set percentage of the profits that the assignee of the
copyright earns from exploiting the work during the terms of the copyright. See generally Don E.
Tomlinson, Everything That Glitters Is Not Gold: Songwriter-Music PublisherAgreements and
Disagreements,18 HASTINGS CoMMIENT L.J. 85, 87 (1995).
39. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 48.
40. Copyright was created in England under the Statute of Anne to protect publishers
under the guise of protecting authors. The King had used British censorship laws, which "granted
to the Stationers' Company . . . a monopoly over book publication, . . . to control the
publication of seditious or heretical works. Publishers were given an exclusive and perpetual
right of publication of works that passed muster with the Government and the Church . . .
there was no intention to protect or reward authors." GORMAN, supra note 36, at 1,The basic
philosophy and contours of the Statute of Anne has dominated the United States copyright law
"for most of our history as a nation." Id.
41. Under the Articles of Confederation, twelve of the thirteen original states had copyright
statutes. Six of the states had modeled their duration provisions after the English Statute of
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Congress the power "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors, the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." '42 Hence,
the Copyright clause43 is both a source of and a limitation on
Congressional power.'

In the United States, "copyright law is the infrastructure
supporting the progress of learning in our free society-and that if it is
to serve this crucial function, the law must take into account not only
rewards for creators and disseminators but also reasonable rights for

46
'45
the users who provide those rewards." This copyright philosophy,
with an emphasis on the public users, exemplifies the difference
between "copyright, which arose under the common law system to
prohibit copying, and authors' rights, which arose under the French
and other civil law systems to protect the property created by the
author."47
The United States does not subscribe to the authors' rights view
of copyright because it views copyright law as a mechanism to secure
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors,

Anne, which provided for an original term of fourteen years and a second term of fourteen years
if the author was still living at the expiration of the first. The other six states adopted single terms
providing protection for fourteen to twenty-one years. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at
167 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright and Associate of Librarian for
Copyright Services).
42. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 48; GORMAN, supra note 36, at 1. See also Peter
A. Jaszi, Impact of TRIPs Agreement on Specific Disciplines: Copyright Literary and Artistic
Works: Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps) Adieu to a Constituionally-Grounded
Discoursein Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 603 n.24 (1996).
45. PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 14.
46. The United States modeled its copyright law after the common law system as opposed
to the authors' rights system. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in
the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (1988). Authors' rights systems recognize two categories of rights:
economic and moral rights. See generally Karen Y. Crabbs, The Future of Authors'and Artists'
Moral Rights in America, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B.A.J. 167 (1992); Patrick J. Zabatta, Moral Rights
and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095 (1992). Since
becoming a signatory to the Berne Convention, the United Statesis required to recognize moral
rights, but in practice this recognition only extends to a limited range of works: "work[s] of visual
art." 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West 1996). Accordingly, the United States' adherance to the Berne
Convention remains questionable. The United States argues that it is in compliance with Article
6bis of the Berne Convention, which relates to moral rights, because domestic law already
provides adequate protection. Zabatta, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 1100.
47.

STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 98-100

(1983). See also Burger, supranote 46, at 5.
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not as one to reward the authors. 48 The primary purpose of United
States' copyright law was, from the outset, to stimulate creative
production for the public good.49 In this spirit, the Framers created a
copyright system which would "'[f]oster the growth of learning and
culture for the public welfare, and the grant exclusive rights to authors
for a limited time as a means to that end."'-' Accordingly, three
policies underscore the American copyright system: first, that
copyright promotes learning; second, that copyright preserves the
public domain; and third, that copyright encourages creation and
distribution of the works by protecting the author.51
The origins and goals of the U.S. copyright system lead us to
inquire: how long should copyright protection last?52 Certainly, the
Framers did not intend for Congress to provide authors with exclusive
rights to extend in perpetuity.53 In fact, as the Register of Copyright
once noted, Congress has the power to give the copyright owner
"exclusive control over the market for his work . . . [though] if his
control were unlimited [in duration], it could become an undue
restraint on the dissemination of the work."I
The Framers considered the potential danger of granting authors
exclusive rights to their works and reduced it by imposing conditions
upon Congress' exercise of this grant. Accordingly, the duration of
copyright protection must promote the "progress of science and useful
arts" and must exist only for a "limited time."55
48. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
49. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1199
(1996) (discussing the ever increasing gulf between copyright protection as a means to encourage
creative activity and as a means to provide for the needs of the deserving author).
50. 1995 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 165 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate of Librarian for Copyright Services, Library of Congress).
51. PATrERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 49.
52. See generally Litman, Domain,supra note 11, at 965; Lange, supra note 11, at 147;
Cohen, supra note 16, at 1180. In their articles, Litman, Lange, and Cohen examine the effect
that the duration of protection granted by the 1976 Copyright Act, life of the author plus fifty,
has had on the public domain. Their arguments and reasoning are applicable to the current
debate over extending the duration of protection.
53. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV.1, 13-36
(1987) (arguing that the constitutional language, when interpreted within the historical context,
directs Congress to establish a regulatory structure as opposed to a system of property rights).
See also Cohen, supra note 16, at 1182.
54. Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961 Report on the General Revision of
the U.S. Copyright Law 5 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3 G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).

55.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8
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What constitutes a limited time? This inquiry seems to beg the
question as to what duration of protection is necessary to encourage
composers to engage in creative work.' "Does any writer write less, or
worse, because of the length of the copyright term?" 7 Common sense
58
tells us the answer to this question: No.
There appears to be no correlation between productivity and
duration of protection.59 A sixty year legal monopoly does not make
the author three times more productive than a twenty year legal
monopoly.' As one scholar noted, "[d]istant advantages tend to be
much less persuasive61 as a motivator of action than relatively
immediate advantage."

If protection extends past this elusive, optimal duration, it has
62
adverse effects upon the public because the public domain suffers.
An excessive duration limits the creative tools available for the
creation of new works.' As Justice Holmes noted:
[Copyright] restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there
would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It
is a[n] [artificial] prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or
tangibles of the party having the right . . . . It is a right which
could not be recognized or endured for more than a limited time,

56. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1181.
57. Id.
58. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflection on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 719,
719 (1945).
59. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1181.
60. Id. at 1186.
61. Id. Authors would rather be compensated up front because the "'difference between a
twenty years' term and a sixty years' term of posthumous copyright would have been nothing or
next to nothing."' Chaffe, supra note 58, at 720.
62. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1181; See also Litman, Domain, supranote 11, at 965 (arguing
that increased copyright protection adversely affects authors by contracting the public domain
from which they subconsciously draw their inspiration). But see 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note
6 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch) (arguing that the public domain is not more plentiful when
works fall out of copyright protection because ownership of a work creates the incentive to
exploit it and preserve it in high quality form).
63. Litman, Domain,supra note 11, at 966-67. During the creative process, an author draws
upon her memories, experiences, inspirations, and influences in creating a new work. Subjecting
the author to suit for this subconscious infringement is going to have some negative effect upon
the author's decision to create and what to create. Id. The public domain is particularly
important for the music industry because "[m]uch music is based on public domain
sources . . . . Popular songs resemble one another-there are only a finite number
of possibilities for this genre." LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 88.
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and . . . it is one which hardly can be conceived except as a
product of statute .... 64

Therefore, while copyright law may create property-like rights, these
and subject to limitations in subject
rights are statutory creatures
65
matter, scope, and duration.
In sum, United States "[c]opyright law is a legal scheme,
prescribed in the Constitution and put in place by Congress, to
encourage the enterprise of authorship . . . . The [copyright] system
creates legal rights akin to property rights. "I But it is crucial to realize

that "[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 6private
benefit."'67 Copyright law creates a limited, statutory monopoly.
B.

Early U.S. Copyright Statutes

The duration of protection for copyright has evolved over the
years to meet societal needs and to accommodate technological
advancements. Accordingly, the subject matter, scope, and duration of
copyrights have expanded since the first federal copyright statute was
enacted.("
The 1790 Copyright Act 7° established an initial copyright term of
fourteen years to be followed, if the author was still alive, by a
fourteen year renewal term. 1 In 1831, Congress increased the term to
twenty-eight years, with an option for renewing it for fourteen more
64. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1183-84 (recounting Holmes' views on copyright in WhiteSmith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1907)).
65. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-20, 302-05 (1994).
66. Litman, Domain,supra note 11, at 970. Moral rights also raise issues regarding the
appropriate duration of protection. An extensive discussion of the differences between U.S. and
authors' rights countries views is beyond the scope of this Note.
67. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
68. Bach, supra note 31, at 382. But see PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 77 (stating
that "[tlhe 1909 act mark[ed] the . . . change from the nineteenth-century view that copyright
was more regulatory than proprietary to the contemporary consensus-whether or not soundthat copyright is more proprietary than regulatory." The authors cite the creation of the
compulsory licensing scheme in section 115 for musical works as an example of the shift from
statutory right to property right).
69. The technological growth since the 1909 Copyright Act has been phenomenal in and of
itself. Copyright law had to change to address works of authorship fixed in new mediums, such as
the phonorecord. For example, sound recordings did not receive federal copyright protection
until the 1909 Act was amended in 1972. See note 26, supra; see also PATrERSON & LINDBERG,
supra note 1, at 90.
70. 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
71. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 167 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate of Librarian for Copyright Services).
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years.' The next increase in the term of copyright protection did not
occur until Congress enacted the 1909 Copyright Act.73 The 1909 Act
increased the renewal term to twenty-eight years, which gave authors
a maximum term of protection of fifty-six years. 74
Prior to the enactment of the 1909 Act, authors had lobbied75
Congress for an increase in the duration of copyright protection.
Authors argued that they were outliving the protection currently
afforded to them and claimed that it was unfair for their works to lose
copyright protection during their lifetimes.76 They also argued that the
growing acceptance of an international standard, which gave an author
copyright protection for his work for the author's life and fifty years
after his death, justified extending the United States' copyright
protection?77 But, despite the minimal opposition against an increase in
duration, "[C]ongress was not willing to accept such a radical
departure from what it saw as the American Copyright tradition:" a
definite number of years plus a renewal feature.7' The U.S. renewal
system was supposed to benefit both the public and the author. The
system allowed works that were not commercially viable to go into the
public domain after twenty-eight years. But it also gave the author, or
his or her heirs, a chance to renew the copyright of valuable works for
an additional term, and to renegotiate the terms of the sale or
licensing of the copyright.' Congress' solution to the concern that the
copyright term should be longer was to increase the renewal term to
twenty-eight years.'
72. Id.
73. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
74. Id.
75. See 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 168 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate of Librarian for Copyright Services).
76. Id. at 168.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; R. Anthony Reese, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on
Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 716-17 (1995). The drafters of the 1909
Act decided "to retain the bipartite term" because only a small percentage of copyrights were
renewed and the structure achieved the appropriate balance between providing authors with the
incentive to create and the public with creative works. Id. Authors who wanted "continued

protection could obtain it by filing for the renewal term." Id. This renewal provision allowed the
author who "had sold her copyright to a publisher for the original term . . . [to] regain
ownership of the copyright to the exclusion of the publisher, by filing for the renewal term." Id.

at 727.
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The 1976 Copyright Act

Several attempts had been made to revise the 1909 Act between
1924 and 1974, but these general revision bills failed.81 Years of
technological advancement and the ambiguity of the 1909 Act, which
required judicial interpretation and interpolation,82 "made the need
for judicial creativity acute."'
By this time, most of the European countries, as well as other
countries across the world, were already parties to an international
agreement on copyright protection, the Berne Convention,' which in
1908 had established a minimum term of protection at life of the

author plus fifty years. 8 The contracting countries were required to
recognize this minimum requirement to achieve the goal of a uniform
international copyright law.

6

Berne signatories could give authors of

other nations that were members of the Convention greater protection
than the standards set out in the Convention, but under no
circumstances could they give lessY

The United States' absence from this major international
copyright agreement was significant for several reasons. While the
United States had been a member of the Universal Copyright
Convention' since the 1950's and had enacted several bilateral and
regional treaties, its efforts to encourage other nations to modernize
81. Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 857 (1987)[hereinafter Litman, Compromise]. By the 1970's, it had become clear that the
1909 Act was outdated and legislative action was imperative. See Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts
on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1977).
82. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 40-41 (1967).
83. Litman, Compromise,supra note 81, at 858-59.
84. Berne Convention, supra note 20. The original Berne Convention was signed on
September 9, 1886 in Berne, Switzerland. The original text of the convention did not establish a
minimum term of protection because of the difficulty of coming to an agreement given the
variations among contracting states at that time. The Berlin Revision of 1908, however,
introduced a new term of protection into the Convention: life plus fifty years after the author's
death. Burger, supra note 46, at 23.
85. Berne Convention, supranote 20, at art. 7(1).
86. Burger, supra note 46, at 16.
87. Berne Convention, supranote 20, at art. 7(6); see also Burger, supra note 46, at 16.
88. The UCC developed as an alternative to Berne to allow major countries, such as the
United States, to participate in an international agreement addressing copyright protection.
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 378
(1990)[hereinafter LEAFFER, TREATIES]. "The basis of the UCC is 'national treatment,' which
requires all member countries to accord the same protection to foreign works eligible under the
UCC as is granted to its own nationals." Id. The UCC only required member states to grant a
minimum copyright term of 25 years from publication or life of the author plus twenty years. Id.
at 379.
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(or implement) copyright law were seriously undermined by its own
absence from the Berne Convention,' which set the international
model for copyright protection. 9° Its absence was also significant
because American authors had few guarantees of protection abroad

and foreign authors had few guarantees of protection within the
United States.9' The 1976 Act was a new, detailed statute that
addressed issues never imagined by drafters of the 1909 statute and,

according to some commentators, it fundamentally changed the
American copyright system. 9 The 1976 Act represented a shift in the
direction of U.S. copyright philosophy' and "was intended to be a
comprehensive solution to our copyright dilemmas. '
The 1976 Copyright Act represents over twenty years of studies
commissioned by Congress and many intense drafting sessions
between "authors, publishers, and other parties with economic
interests in the property rights which the statute defines."' The
legislative process used to design the 1976 Act was interesting because

Congress delegated authority to an advisory council of more than one
hundred industry representatives and insisted that they sit down with
one other and reach mutually agreeable solutions on the substantive
issues. 96 Pursuant to this mandate, "the Copyright Office and

interested parties hammered out the basic structure of the entire

89. The United States did not become a member of the Berne Convention until 1988. See
Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-104, 116, 301, 401-402, 404-08, 801 (1988))[hereinafter BCIA].
90. See generally Jon A. Baumgarten & Christopher A. Meyer, Effects of U.S. Adherence to
the Berne Convention, 37 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 462 (Mar. 9, 1989).
91. Before the U.S. joined the Berne Convention, American authors were able to reap the
benefits of Berne Convention through the "back door." LEAFFER, supranote 29, at 349. To take
advantage of Berne privileges, American authors had to simultaneously publish their works in
the U.S. and a Berne country. Id. However, this technique required money, time, and resources
that not all American authors possessed. Id. Before joining Berne in 1988, the United States
protected copyrights in foreign markets primarily through bilateral agreements. A. LATMAN, R.
GORMAN, J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 795 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
92. Litman, Compromise, supra note 81, at 858-59.
93. Id. at 859; PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 91 (1991)(quoting Barbara Ringer,
Register of Copyrights, who played a prominent role in the revision process).
94. Marci A. Hamilton, The Herbert Tenzer Memorial Conference: Copyright in the Twenty
FirstCentury: Introduction, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9, 9 (1994).
95. Litman, Compromise,supra note 81, at 861 (stating that the 1976 Copyright Act
represents a delicate balance between competing interests, which explains the difficulty the
courts have had in interpreting the Act. The legislative history reflects this delicate balance.).
96. Id. at 871-72.
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statute before including Congress"' in the legislative process.8
According to Representative Robert Kastenmeier, who sponsored the
99
1976 Copyright Act, "all interests in this bill are special interests."
Much of the debate leading up to the passage of the 1976 Act

centered on whether or not to extend the duration of copyright
protection.'W Proponents of a term increase argued that the increase
was necessary for the U.S. to gain preeminence in the international
community for protection of intellectual property, such as
copyrights. 10 ' In order to compete internationally, proponents argued,
U.S. copyright law had to be brought into compliance with the

minimum terms of copyright protection as set forth in the Berne
Convention. 1" They also claimed that the term increase, given the

increasing lifespan, was necessary to provide authors and their heirs
with the requisite economic incentiveslW
The statutory language of the 1976 Act reflects the tumultuous
process of negotiation and compromise that the proposed legislation
underwent. 4 One of the most critical compromises involved the
controversial and intertwined issues of initial ownership, duration of
copyright, and reversion of rights.'
The music industry, i.e.,
97. Id. at 870. Professor Litman observes that, while some have called this an egregious
delegation of legislative authority to the ones the statute purports to regulate, others have
classified it as a brilliant way to deal with a complicated matter. Id. at 879. She, however, takes
the position that the merit of this process hinges at least partially upon the statute that it
produces. Id.
98. See generally Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Congress worked on the copyright revision
process on their own as well. Litman, Compromise,supra note 81, at 870.
99. U.S. Copyright Office, Briefing Papers on Current Issues, reprinted in Copyright Law
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administrationof Justice of the House JudiciaryComm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 853 (1975).
100. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 169-70 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate of Librarian for Copyright Services).
101. Id. at 172 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 134-5 (1976)).
102. Id. at 163 (quoting Representative Carlos J. Moorhead).
103. Id. at 170.
104. Litman, Compromise, supranote 81, at 860, 869.
105. See id. at 865-66 nn. 56-57. Professor Litman identifies section 304(c), relating to the
termination of transfers and licenses covering the renewal period for subsisting copyrights, as a
product of the compromise process that generated the 1976 Act. She examines Mills Music, Inc.
v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985), a case in which section 304(c)'s legislative history proved to be
ambigous at best. Id. at 863-64. At issue in Mills was the division of post-termination royalty
income derived from the sale of sound recordings of a copyrighted song. The heirs had notified
the music publisher of their termination of the author's 1940 grant of rights in the renewal
copyright. Id. A divided Court decided to preserve the royalty division agreement between the
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publishers and distributers, wanted to eliminate the provisions
allowing copyright ownership to revert back to the author when the
author renewed the copyright term. The authors and their heirs
wanted to retain these reversion provisions in order to renegotiate the
re-relinquishment of their rights on better terms. 106
The current duration provisions' ° resulted from a series of
compromises involving the provisions relating to termination,1' fair
author and Mills; both the majority and the dissent relied upon the legislative history of section
304(c). Id. at 863 nn.46-47. This decision has been viewed by others as a blatant misinterpretation
of the purpose of the termination provision-to benefit authors. Alan J. Hartnick, New
Developments in Who Gets What From Music Performances,211 N.Y. L.J. 7 (1994); see also 1995
House Hearings,supra note 10, at 315 (statement of Professor William F. Patry).
106. Litman, Compromise, supra note 81, at 866 nn.56-57. The 1976 Act "abolished the
original renewal terms of the 1909 Act and instead generally grants an author copyright
protection for a single term lasting until fifty years after her death." Reese, supra note 80, at 708.
However, "[w]ithin the new single term, the 1976 Act in fact retains a primary feature of the
renewal system: the reversion to an author (or her successors), midway through the term, of any
rights she has previously transferred." Id. This reversion or "termination right makes an author's
intervivos grant of a copyright interest terminable by the author . . . [or his heirs] during the
period between thirty-five and forty years after the grant's date of execution." Id. at 732.
Reversion ensures that the surviving dependents of an author, or her assignees, will be able to
exploit the benefits of an older, economically viable work. Id. at 737.
107. The provisions regarding the duration of protection afforded to the various copyrights
are set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-05. 17 U.S.C. § 301, Preemption with respect to other laws,
provides in relevant part:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 302 provides in part:
(a) In General-Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from
its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death.
(b) Joint Works.-In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors who did
not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of the life of the last
surviving author and fifty years after such last surviving author's death.
(c) Anonymous Works, Pseudonymous Works, and Works Made for Hire.-In the case
of an anonymous work, pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright
endures for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publication, or a term
of one hundred years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first ....
17 U.S.C. § 303 provides in part:
Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public
domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978 and endures for the term
provided by section 302 . ...
17 U.S.C. § 304 provides in part:
(a) Copyrights in Their First Term on January 1, 1978.-(1)(A) Any copyright, the first
term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall endure for 28 years from the date it
was originally secured.
(B) In the case of-
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use, and the definition of works made for hire.1" Authors benefited by

increasing the term of protection to one measured by the life of the
(i) any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work
upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or
(ii) any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or
licensee of the individual author) or by an employer for whom such work is made for
hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of
the copyright for the further term of 47 years.
(C) In the case of any other copyrighted work, ...
(i) the author of such work, if the author is still living,
(ii) the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author is not living,
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further
term of 47 years.
(2)(A) At the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work specified in
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, the copyright shall endure for a renewed and
extended further term of 47 years, which(i) if an application to register a claim to such further term has been made to the
Copyright Office within 1 year before the expiration of the original term of
copyright, and the claim is registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further
term, in the proprietor of the copyright who is entitled to claim the renewal of
copyright at the time the application is made; or
(ii) if no such application is made or the claim pursuant to such application is not
registered, shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in the person or
entity that was the proprietor of the copyright as of the last day of the original term
of copyright.
(b) Copyrights in Their Renewal Term or Registered for Renewal Before January 1,
1978.-The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting at any
time between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, or for which
renewal registration is made [during this period], is extended to endure for a term of
seventy-five years from the date copyright was originally secured.
(c) Termination of Transfers and Licenses Covering Extended Renewal Term.-In the
case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January 1, 1978,
• . . the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the renewal
copyright or any right under it, executed before January 1, 1978 . .. is subject to
termination . ...
17 U.S.C. § 305 provides:
All terms of copyright provided by sections 302 through 304 run to the end of the
calendar year in which they would otherwise expire.
108. 1995 House Hearing,supra note 10, at 335 (statement of Professor William F. Patry).
109. Litman, Compromise, supra note 81, at 867.
17 U.S.C. § 107 provides in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, or
research) is not an infringement of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a "work made for hire" as one in which "a work [is] prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or . . . a work specially ordered or
...
The concept of a "work
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work.
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author. 10 The industries involved in the dissemination of copyrighted
works also benefitted from the longer terms of protection because the
work remained under its control for a longer period of time before
passing into the public domain.' Authors also successfully retained
the right to terminate the grant of copyright for a five-year period
beginning thirty-five years after execution of such grant."1 And the
United States could finally seek membership in the Berne Convention.

III
International Copyright Agreements
While the 1976 Copyright Act and subsequent amendments to it
have brought U.S. copyright law closer to international norms,1", U.S.
copyright law and its underlying philosophy is still unique compared to
that of its major European trading partners.114 United States copyright
law does not control the international arena. International copyright
agreements, such as the Berne Convention and the EC Duration
Directive, have set the standards for copyright protection for the
world, and have affected U.S. copyright law to a certain extent.
u5
A. The Berne Convention

The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works is the focal point for "any discussion of international copyright
protection."'1 6 Berne is the oldest international agreement protecting
authors' rights, and currently it "provides the broadest multilateral
basis for international copyright protection."" 7 It is a remarkable
made for hire" is important because of the implications it has, not only on ownership of
copyright, but also on duration since the "life plus fifty" formula does not apply. Gorman, supra
note 36, at 49.
110. Litman, Compromise, supranote 81, at 867.
111.
See generally Chaffee, supra note 58, at 720. If authors are more concerned with
obtaining compensation up front, the music industry will probably not need to compensate
authors proportionally to the increase in the term of protection.
112. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 8 (1977).
113. LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 351.
114. Historical differences between common law copyright tradition and continental authors'
rights tradition are still pervasive. See generally Burger, supra note 46, at 5-8.
115. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised, Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
116. Anne Moebes, Negotiating International Copyright Protection: The United States and
European Community Positions, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 301, 303 (1992). The UCC has a
smaller membership and has traditionally been viewed as the less influential of the two
international agreements on copyright protection.
117. Id. at 305.
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international agreement in that it has successfully bridged different
copyright philosophies and resolved conflicts for over one hundred
years.118
Signatories to the Berne Convention "constitute a Union for the
protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works
on the international level."11 9 The mission of the Berne, since its
inception in 1886, has been to achieve universal copyright
protection.' Yet this mission has been complicated by the underlying
ideological differences between the contracting parties' as to what
copyright is supposed to protect.21
The United States acceded to the Berne Convention in 1989' z
and it has "enacted amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act that
brought U.S. copyright law into technical conformity with the Berne
Convention as revised at Paris in 1971."1 However, the United
States, according to some critics, took the "minimalist approach" in
implementing Berne,1" making "only the essential changes [to its law
that were] necessary to comply with Convention obligations."1
In the United States, which follows the common law copyright
system, the grant of copyright ideally provides authors with the
economic incentive to create for the public benefit, not for the
authors' benefit alone." Common law copyright countries "focus
more on the owner of the copyright, whether that be the author,
publisher, broadcaster, individual, or corporation."'' 7 This focus on the
copyright owner represents a crucial distinction between common law
and civil law copyright systems. In civil law countries, copyright
protects "authors' rights" first and foremost, focusing "almost
exclusively on the individual author."1" Under this authors' rights
118. Burger, supra note 46, at 1.
119. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 1.
120. Burger, supra note 46, at 11.
121. Id. at7.
122. Since treaties are not self-executing in the United States, legislation had to be
introduced into Congress to finalize the U.S. membership in Berne. S.Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The history of the Berne Convention and the manner of its administration
are expounded in H. R. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-17 (1988). BCIA, supra note 89.
123. Burger, supranote 46, at 2; see BCIA, supra note 89.
124. LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 352 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. (emphasis in original). Some scholars would argue that the U.S. has not even made
these essential changes.
126. Lange, supra note 11, at 160 n.56 (characterizing copyright as a barter transaction).
127. Burger, supranote 46, at 7.
128. Id.
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system, copyright is a natural property right that the author obtains by
virtue of the labor he or she has expended to create the artistic or
literary work.' Consequently, copyright law in those countries is
perceived to be more favorable to the author. Authors' rights
in
countries do not place as high a premium on the public's interest
3
easy access to works as do common law copyright countries.
The difference between these two philosophies was, and
continues to be, a source of tension and conflict at the international
level during the Berne revision conferences 31 Consequently, the
Berne represents a series of compromises between the different
copyright philosophies of its contracting members.' For instance, the
Berne Convention did not attempt to create a body of supranational
copyright law. 33 Instead, it sought to create a workable system
premised on reforming the copyright laws of the signatory nations
themselves.1" The Berne established certain minimum standards of
protection which all contracting countries were required to
recognize.135 Therefore, a
copyrighted work is protected by the national legislation of the
country . . . of origin, and not by the Berne Convention's
provisions themselves. Thus, while any country may join the Berne
Convention, it must be prepared to implement national legislation to
conform to 36the minimum standards set forth in the Berne
Convention.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 143-154 (discussing moral rights and current
dilemmas with the perceived U.S. non-compliance with Art. 6 bis).
132. Burger, supra note 46, at 15.
133. In the original 1884 Conference, on the issue of what form the ultimate product of
Conference should embody, the delegates broke down into three philosophical groups
advocating a codified international copyright law (universal law), a codified international law of
copyright with domestic flexibility, and a treaty built on reciprocity with as little unification as
possible (natural law). Id. at 12-13.
134. The majority position at the 1886 Conference was that the Convention should set some
common legislation and leave some matters to national law. Id. at 15.
135. See Berne Convention, supra note 20, at arts. 7(1) and 36. For instance, a contracting
state must provide the term of protection granted by the Convention in order to be eligible for
Berne membership. The United States could not become a Berne member until it had amended
U.S. copyright law to reflect this minimum term of protection Id. at art. 36(2).
136. Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 36; Moebes, supra note 116, at 303. It is also
interesting to note that the Berne does not circumscribe copyright agreements that supplement
the Convention. "Member countries may sign separate agreements among themselves if those
agreements meet the minimum standards of, and do not contradict, the Berne Convention."
Moebes, supra note 116, at 303; see Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 20. The EC
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Despite numerous revisions and additions, the general structure7
of the Berne Convention has remained constant over the years.However, the scope of authors' rights has increased through revisions
regarding the works that will be protected under the Berne and the
specific rules governing the term of protection affoided to these
different types of works.'
The Berne broadly defines the types of literary and artistic works
that it recognizes for protection 39 It is important to note that while
musical compositions are protected and require the minimum duration
of protection, sound recordings are not formally protected under the
Berne Convention. 14° However, two international treaties, the
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
("Rome
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations1 4
Convention") and the Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms
("Geneva Convention"),'4 2 do provide protection for sound
recordings.
The Berne also recognizes and provides protection for moral
rights.143 Under Berne, an author has moral rights, in addition to
economic rights, in his or her works.' The protected moral rights
consist of the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to

Duration Directive is a perfect example of a separate agreement among Berne signatories. See
supra note 22.
137. Burger, supra note 46, at 15.
138. Id. at 15-16.
139. See Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 2(1).
140. See generally Litman Compromise, supranote 81, at 787-810 (1989).
141. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
142. LEAFFER, TREATIES, supra note 88, at 415-36. The Rome Convention protects rights that
are known as droits voisins or neighboring rights. Id. at 415. The Rome Convention is based on
national treatment and establishes "minimum rights [such as performance rights] that must be
conferred for performers and producers of phonograms . . . . Protection is granted for a
20-year term." Id. at 416. The Geneva Convention is similar to the Rome Convention but differs
in that it does not create substantive rights, i.e., neighboring rights. In fact, the Geneva
Convention was promulgated because "many states that did not recognize neighboring rights,
e.g., the United States, refused to adhere to the Rome Convention." Id. at 430. Accordingly, the
Geneva Convention requires only that the phonograms be protected. Id. "[T]he mode of
protection is left to domestic law: whether by copyright, unfair competition, or by penal
sanctions." Id. The United States belongs to the Geneva Convention but not the Rome
Convention. Id.
143. Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 6 bis.
144. Id. at art. 6 bis (1).
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any distortion, mutilation, or any other modification which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.145
Moral rights are independent of economic rights and hence
continue even after the author has transferred the copyright to
another.' 6 The Berne provisions regarding moral rights must appeal
to a large cross-section of nations, some of which may not be as
protective of authors' rights as others. The drafters of these provisions
compromised on the moral rights issue by allowing each contracting
nation to decide the duration of protection. 147 However, it appears as
though the protection must, at a minimum, exist for the life of the
author. 48
The moral rights issue has been a source of contention between
149
the U.S. and authors' rights countries such as France and Germany.
When the U.S. acceded to the Berne Convention it obligated itself to
adopt measures to provide the minimum standards, including those on
moral rights.' However, the United States has traditionally not
provided specific moral rights protection"5 and would have had to
alter the U.S. copyright system in order to add this type of
protection.' Therefore, the U.S. decided that current domestic law,
such as unfair competition, defamation, privacy and contract law,
adequately protect an author and his or her desire to prevent
"improper alterations of an author's work."'' 3 This minimalist
approach has angered a great number of authors' rights nations
because they classify the U.S. attitude as a breach of the Berne
Convention.'
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at art. 6 bis (2).
148. See id.
149. As noted above, an extensive discussion of the moral rights issue is beyond the scope of
this Note. See generally Crabbs, supra note 46, at 168.
150. Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 36. Article 36 provides:
(1) Any country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its

constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Convention.
(2) It is understood that, at the time a country becomes bound by this Convention, it
will be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this
Convention.
151. C.f. Crabbs, supra note 46, at 168 n.23 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115, and explaining that
restrictions upon altering the musical composition underlying the sound recording constitute a
type of moral rights protection).
152. See id. at 168 n.26.
153. LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 352; see also Crabbs, supra note 46, at 168.
154. Crabbs, supra note 46, at 168.
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The Berne also sets out the general terms regarding the duration
of protection. The minimum standard for protection is the life of the
author plus fifty years after his death,u1 but the countries of the Berne
Union are free to grant a term in excess of this minimum. 1 6 Because a
country is free to grant a term in excess of the Berne minimum, article
7(8) of the Convention gives the country the option of granting that
longer term to authors of other Berne Union countries, or of applying
the shorter minimum term. ls7
B.

The EC Duration Directive

On October 23, 1993, the Council of Ministers, which makes the
major policy decisions necessary to govern the European Community,
issued the "Duration Directive."'" The Council directed member
states to harmonize the term of protection for copyright and certain
related rights."5 9 It also specified that member states had to "bring into
force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to
comply with [the directive] before 1 July, 1995. ' ' 11 Member states of
the European Community (EC) must comply with this directive
because it is a form of supranational legislation. 61
The Duration Directive requires that each member state increase
its copyright protection term to "run for the life of the author and for
seventy years after his death."'" The EC's decision to promulgate and
implement the Duration Directive was driven by the necessity of
addressing the differences between the national laws of European
Union (EU) member states that were "liable to impede the free
movement of goods and freedom to provide services and to distort
competition in the common market." 1"
Since the Berne Convention had only laid down minimum terms,
164
contracting states were free to adopt longer terms of protection.
155. Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 7(1).
156. Id. at art. 7(6).
157. See id. at art. 7(8).
158. EC Duration Directive, supra note 22.
159. Id.
160. Id. at art. 13(1).
161. The Duration Directive issued by the European Council, unlike the provisions of
Berne, is binding upon the members states of the European Union (EU).
162. EC Duration Directive, supra note 22, at art. 1. However, to date only one member has
enacted national legislation implementing the terms of the Duration Directive. Brownlee, supra
note 23, at 596 n.90.
163. EC Duration Directive, supra note 22, at Recital 2.
164. Id. at Recital 1.
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Some EC members, also signatories to the Berne Convention, had
provided authors with terms of copyright protection greater than the
Berne minimum (life of the author plus fifty) within their national
laws."6 Different terms of protection combined with the member
states' geographical proximity to one another, and the increasing
growth of supranational Community law, posed problems for
achieving a fully integrated European Community.
The Council was aware of the problems that stemmed from the
lack of harmony in the copyright law of its members."6 Prior to 1993,
the Council had issued several directives that began to remedy the
situation within certain fields of intellectual property such as computer
programs. 16 7 However, what finally prodded the EC into a thorough
response to the harmonization problem was the 1989 decision of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia
Im-Und Export.I
In EMI Electrola,119 the plaintiff alleged an infringement of its
exclusive distribution rights for sound recordings on German territory
and brought an action to enjoin the defendants from selling sound
recordings imported from Denmark in such territory. 170 The defendant
companies argued that the sound recordings had been lawfully
marketed in Denmark because the period during which exclusive
rights are protected under Danish copyright law had already expired 7
and hence the phonographic records were legally marketed in
Germany without paying any licensing fee.172 "However, in Germany
the sound recordings were still in 'copyright' . . . ."7' The ECJ held

for the German plaintiff based on articles within the EEC treaty, and
in reaching its decision chastised the Council by pointing out that this

165. The greatest of the different term lengths were recognized by Germany and Spain.
"Germany provided 70 years p.m.a. protection and Spain provided 60 years." See Brownlee,
supra note 23, at 596 n.87.
166. David Bradshaw, The EC Copyright Duration Directive:Its Main Highlights and Some
of its Ramificationsfor Businesses in the UK EntertainmentIndustry, 6 ENT. L.R. 171, 171 n.4
(1995).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 171.
169. Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-Und Export, 1989 E.C.R. 79 (1989).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Bradshaw, supra note 166, at 171.
173. Id. Germany provided copyright protection for life of the author plus seventy years.
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problem arose due to the lack
of harmonization of legislation
174
regarding copyright protection.
The EC, in order to effectuate its desire of a single internal
market, therefore needed to harmonize the duration of copyright
protection. 75 The Council of Ministers issued the Duration Directive
with "a view the smooth operation of the internal market, . . . to
176
make terms of protection identical throughout the Community."
The Duration Directive represents an agreement entered into by
signatories to the Berne Convention which provides protection in
excess of that mandated by Berne."7 The directive operates in
addition to the Berne Convention. 78
The Council cited the growing lifespan of authors to justify its
decision to adopt a term of life plus seventy. 79 The Council found that
the Berne minimum was no longer a sufficient period of protection for
1s
the author and the first two generations of his descendants.
However, this finding must be viewed in the context of the fact that
the EC is comprised of nations embracing the authors' rights approach
as discussed above.
European countries, as members of the Berne Convention, are
obligated to protect U.S. works by one of two methods.1 81 They can
either act according to the protection that the work would receive in
the United States or they can give the work the protection that the
European state would grant works by its nationals."a The EC
Duration Directive, however, eliminates the latter of these methods.
To ensure copyright harmonization, the Duration Directive
specifically mandates that EC members adopt the rule of the shorter

174. Id.
175. EC Duration Directive, supra note 22, Recitals 1 and 2.
176. Id. at Recital 2.
177. Article 20 of the Berne Convention provides:
The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into special
agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more
extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not
contrary to this Convention. The provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these
conditions shall remain applicable.
Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 20.
178. Id.
179. EC Duration Directive, supra note 22, Recital 5.
180. Id.
181. Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 7(8).
182. Id.
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term with respect to non-EC works.1" Since the Berne Convention
proposes this approach when dealing with other Berne Union states,
EC members do not violate any Berne provision by complying with
this directive.l" However, if members do not apply the rule of the
shorter term, the EC will have problems with intra-community trade
and such a decision would threaten the workings of the Single
Market.""
The rule of the shorter term operates in this fashion: while EC
members will be bound under EC law to protect works created by
authors from other EC members for life plus seventy, American works
will only receive protection for life plus fifty, the current duration
under the 1976 Act.' s The term of protection for American works in
Europe will turn upon U.S. law. Accordingly, the Duration Directive,
and this rule in particular, has frightened those Americans who benefit
from the exportation of American intellectual property."s This fear of
losing twenty years of monetary benefits is the driving force behind
the Copyright Term Extension Act.

IV
The Copyright Term Extension Act
A. Background

Recent expansion of international copyright protection, combined
with the impending passage of popular American musical works into

188
the public domain, is a source of great concern to some Americans.

The United States, given its reputation as one of the world's leading
exporters of intellectual property, has begun to reconsider its term of
copyright protection in light of these international and domestic
183. Id. at art. 7(1).
184. Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 7(8). In fact, prior to the issuance of the
Duration Directive, "Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and
the Netherlands appl[ied] the rule of the shorter term ....
Brownlee, supra note 23, at 596.
185. If one considers the fact pattern as 'set forth in EMI Electrola, the Council's decision as
to treatment of works originating outside of the EC becomes clear. The rule of the shorter term
or comparison of terms must be adopted by all of the EC members or the EC will not realize its
goal of copyright harmonization.
186. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch)(suggesting that
the loss of 20 years copyright protection amounts to, in trade dollars, a devastating blow to U.S.
trade).
187. Id.
188. 1995 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 205 (statement of Ambassador Charlene
Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative).
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developments. 1" While the 1976 Act has been amended several times
since it became effective, 11° the proposed Copyright Term Extension
Act represents the first attempt to extend the duration of protection
since the term was extended to life of the author plus fifty years. 9 ' In
1993, after the issuance of the Duration Directive, the U.S. began to
contemplate an amendment to the duration provisions. The Copyright
Office began conducting studies and held hearings inviting public
comment before any legislation had been proposed. 9 The majority of
the attendees were lyricists, composers, music publishers, record
companies, and motion picture industry representatives. 193
B.

Effect of the Proposed Amendment

The proposed Copyright Term Extension Act extends the
duration of protection given to authors, including lyricists and music
composers, to a term consisting of the life of the author plus seventy
years after the author's death."9 The sponsors of the Act feel that an
additional twenty years of protection is necessary to help U.S.
intellectual property remain competitive abroad."9
The proposed legislation provides an across the board twenty
year increase in copyright terms.'" For instance, works already in
existence, if the author of the preexisting work is still alive, would
receive a term of protection identical to those created in the future
after the effective date of the Act. 197 Works in which the author is not
189.

The Copyright Office began conducting hearings and studies after the European

Community reached a final agreement in June of 1993 regarding life plus seventy as a uniform
standard of copyright duration, and the Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the
Berne Convention began discussing the possibility of life plus seventy as the new minimum
standard of protection. Copyright Office Considers Life Plus 70 Years, 11 J. OF PROPRIETARY RTS.

30, 31 (Nov. 1993).
190. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 is just one of these amendments.
See BCIA, supranote 89.
191. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 161 (statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services, Library of Congress).
192. Copyright Office Considers Life Plus 70 Years, supra note 189, 30-31.
193. Id.
194. S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(1) (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(1)

(1995).
195. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch); 1995 House
Hearings,supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Representative Carlos Moorhead).
196. S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3 (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3
(1995).
197. Orrin Hatch, Copyright Term Extension Act, Congressional Press Releases, March 1,
1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
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alive would also receive an additional twenty years of protection,

provided that the works have not already gone into the public
domain.' s
Terms of copyright protection which are not tied to the life of the
author, i.e., older works on the fixed term system and "works made for
hire," 1" would also receive the benefit of an additional twenty years of
protection.' This means that works that have already been renewed,
or that are up for renewal soon, would receive a renewal period of
sixty-seven years in lieu of the forty-seven year renewal period which

took into account the changes in duration from the 1976 Copyright
Act. 2' 1 "Works made for hire' would be protected for 95 years from
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter.2
"Anonymous ' ' 3 and "pseudonymous works"' would also get a
twenty year increase under the proposed legislation.'
Lyricists and the music industry in general favor the proposed
extension.' Their support stems largely from the personal benefit
they would derive from such an extension.'

The proposed extension

would entitle the songwriter's estate to collect the royalties from his or
her works for an additional two decades before these works would fall
into the public domain.2 Opposition to the proposed extension comes
primarily from the academic community.'

198. S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d)
(1995).
199. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see note 109 supra.
200. S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(b)(3), 2(d) (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 2(b)(3), 2(d)(1995).
201. Id.
202. S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(b)(4), 2(d) (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 2(b)(4), 2(d)(1995).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) provides that "[an anonymous work is a work on the copies or
phonorecords of which no natural person is identified as author."
204. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) provides that "[a] 'pseudonymous work' is a work on the copies
or phonorecords of which the author is identified under a fictitious name."
205. S. 483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(3) (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(3)
(1995).
206. See generally 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statements of songwriters Don
Henley, Quincy Jones, Bob Dylan, and Carlos Santana).
207. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 272-73 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett,
daughter of composer Irving Berlin).
208. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
209. See 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi); 1995 House
Hearings,supra note 10, at 292-311 (statement of Professor Dennis S. Karjala).
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Special Interests at Work-Arguing For Life Plus Seventy

Those individuals who have an economic stake in the United
States copyright system influence the legislative process because the
system is abstract and difficult for the layperson to understand.
Consequently, the proposed legislation in this case, as well as others,
likely benefits the interested individuals. Proponents of the term
extension argue that the current term does not provide the requisite
protection, namely protection for the life of the author and two
generations. 10 Increasing lifespans and the tendency to have one's
children later in life, they argue, make life plus fifty years inadequate
to meet this target term of protection."'
Authors and composers argue that it is reasonable for them to
consider their copyrights as "valuable resource[s] to be passed on to
' '2
their children and through them into the succeeding generation. 1
According to many composers, it never occurred to them that their
songs-their legacy to their children-would someday fall into the
public domain, as opposed to passing to their estate after their deaths
and providing a source of income to successive generations. 21 Heirs
feel that it is "monstrously unfair that other recognized forms of
property-lands, business, and so on-can be handed down
indefinitely, . . . whereas the value of intellectual property under
current copyright laws is arbitrarily cut off . .
,214

Proponents also argue that new technologies make older works
commercially viable and exploitable for longer periods of time.21
Consequently, allowing these works, upon which authors' livelihoods
are based, to enter the public domain will cause great hardship to the
authors and their families.216 A term extension will increase the
economic rewards of creativity which, in turn, will stimulate continued
artistic activity.2 7
210. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 272 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett, daughter
of composer Irving Berlin).
211. Id. at 235 (statement of songwriter Quincy Jones).
212. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
213. 1995 House Hearings,supranote 10, at 235-36, 240 (statements of Quincy Jones and
Bob Dylan).
214. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Shana Alexander, writer and daughter

of songwriter Milton Ager). She also states that "in a family such as ours intellectual property is
the only property." Id.
215. 1995 House Hearings, supra note 10, at 248 (statement of Ellen Donaldson, Vice

President of Donaldson Publishing Company).
216. Id. at 272 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett, daughter of composer Irving Berlin).
217. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Don Henley, songwriter).

19961

THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION

AcT

Yet, the most powerful argument for extending the term of
protection that proponents have proffered is the recent changes in
copyright duration within the European Community. "The changed
rules pertaining to copyright duration are of critical practical
' U.S.
importance to the international exploitation of existing works."218
authors and works will, by operation of these changed rules, be
discriminated against abroad.2 19 Now that the EC Duration Directive
has been implemented, U.S. copyright protection in Europe will be
measured by "the rule of the shorter term."
Songwriters, such as Don Henley, argue that if the U.S. does not
act quickly to extend U.S. law, then Europe will get "essentially a
twenty-year free-ride . . . they [will be able to] use and abuse our

works for free, while we [will] have to pay for the use of theirs."
Since it is undisputed that American music is popular abroad, 1 this
would result in an enormous loss in valuable trade dollars.'
Proponents argue that this proposed extension is true to the
Constitutional grant of copyright. They argue that Congress must have
the power to grant exclusive rights to authors for a term of life plus
seventy years. They state that the "change is necessary to strengthen
the economic incentives to our creators, to maintain our international
trading position, to protect our investment in intellectual property and
to help preserve our culture."' Therefore, this proposed term falls
within the "broad and flexible" 22 requirement that the Framers set
forth in Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, that Congress
grant such rights "for limited Times. ' 2

218. Brownlee, supra note 23, at 585.
219. Id.
220. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 241 (statement of Don Henley, songwriter).
221. "European audiences have always enthusiastically welcomed American popular
musicians. They buy our records, they play our music over the airways and they attend our
concerts." Id. at 240 (statement of Bob Dylan, songwriter).
222. "Copyright term extension is very much in America's economic interest. Along with our
country's interest in maintaining the trade surplus we currently enjoy in the area of intellectual
property, I respectfully urge this Congress to also consider the prospective loss of American
culture .... " 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 245 (statement of Ellen Donaldson, vice
president of Donaldson Publishing Company).
223. See Price, supra note 13, at A2; 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of

Senator Orrin Hatch).
224. Senator Orrin Hatch argues that the copyright and patent clause should be interpreted
broadly and flexibly to be true to the Framers' intent. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 6
(statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).

225. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
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D. Public Interests at Work-Arguing Against Life Plus Seventy

Opponents of the extension argue that traditionally, the
Copyright Clause' has been given a much narrower interpretation
than the one currently espoused by the proponents of this
legislation. 227 Extensions of the duration of copyright protection have
been gradual, and hotly debated, since Congress enacted the first
copyright statute.228 For instance, the United States was reluctant to
increase copyright protection in 1909 because it felt that a term of "life
plus fifty" was a departure from its traditional copyright roots.'
Congress was reluctant to extend the duration of protection even
though other Western countries had adopted this term or even longer
terms. 2 It was not until sixty-nine years later that Congress approved
the change from a fixed term to a longer term measured by the life of
the author.23" As one participant in the recent Congressional hearings
revealed:
Each time the term of protection was increased in the past, there
appeared to be ample justification for increasing the term ...
[T]oday the need to increase the copyright term is not as pressing as
it was in 1831, 1909, or 1978 . ...232

Thus, opponents argue that the extension is premature and
unwarranted at this time.
Members of academic circles, who oppose the extension, claim to
represent the interests of "the larger community of users of the 'public
domain' materials. "I They argue that typical music listeners and the
users of other "public domain" materials are threatened by the
proposed extension.' According to these critics, the fact that the
support for the extension comes almost exclusively from the parties

226. Id.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 39-68 (discussing historical origins of American
copyright law).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 69-80 (discussing early copyright statutes).
229. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 168 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 170.
232. Id. at 215 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Asst. Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks)(favoring the extension after balancing the benefits
and detriments).
233. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).
234. Id.
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that benefit from a longer term of protection demonstrates that 5the
proposed extension does not take the users' interests into account.2
Opponents argue that extending copyright weakens the "public
domain"2 and makes public access to works more difficult.'
Although it is true that when a work passes into the "public domain" it

does not necessarily become cheaper,n an extended term of copyright
would shrink the informational commons that people turn to for

information in educational or creative situations.3 9
Proponents argue that extra protection provides authors with the
economic incentive to create. Yet this argument cuts both ways:
authors must receive financial benefits from their works but they also
must be free to create, i.e., have the requisite tools available. No
creator would create if he or she was in constant fear of subconsciously
infringing upon the work of another creator.' For these reasons the
"public domain" is a source of real social value, and incursions should
not be undertaken lightly. 1 The public domain should be of particular
importance to the music industry because, as discussed above, "much
music is based on public domain sources . . . . Popular songs
resemble one another-there are only a finite number of possibilities
for this genre. "242
Another flaw in this "economic incentive to create" argument
arises when one considers that the twenty year extension applies
across the board. It extends the protection of works already in
existence. To say that we need to extend the term of protection for
works that the author has already created without the incentive of
increased protection is simply fantastic.24 3 An extension cannot be the
incentive for works already in existence.'
235. The expansion of Twentieth Century copyright protection is a product of "the interests
of small but organized groups [rather] than the interests of the public at large." Stewart E. Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1244-45 (1996).
236. See generally Litman, Domain, supranote 11.
237. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).
238. Id. (statement of Quincy Jones, songwriter); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 10, at
217-18 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Asst. Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks).
239. See generally Litman, Domain, supranote 11, at 1019.
240. Id. Copyright infringement is a strict liability offense; there is no intent or knowledge
requirement.
241. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).
242. LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 88.
243. See Sterk, supra note 235, at 1197.
244. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 292 (statement of Professor Dennis Karjala).
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Opponents argue, in response to proponents' claim of an
entitlement to protection for two succeeding generations, that the U.S.
has never subscribed to these goals. The U.S. does not consider
copyright as a "natural right" as do many countries in continental
Europe.5 U.S. copyright law has never provided "a legacy for two
generations"' ' 6 nor did the Framers intend for it to do so.2 7 In sum,
why should an author need income for his or her grandchildren?'
The United States has always viewed copyright primarily as a
vehicle for achieving social benefit based on the belief that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance the public welfare." 9 This philosophy distinguishes U.S.
Accordingly, the
copyright law from that of other countries.'
opponents argue that many of the reasons given by the proponents to
extend copyright can be dismissed due to the nature of the right that
U.S. copyright law affords to authors."'
Opponents do, however, have a more difficult time addressing the
argument that the extension is necessary for international trade
purposes.252 As the proponents cite, intellectual property is the United
States' second largest export,253 and as the opponents concede, the
extra protection "will bring extra income to the owners of some
internationally popular domestic works."'
The threat of losing the trade surplus in copyrighted works, which
stems in part from the success American works enjoy abroad, appears
daunting at first glance. However, whether or not a U.S. copyright
extension is the appropriate response to the EC Duration Directive is
not as simple as the proponents argue.
245. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).
246. Id.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 39-55 (discussing historical origins of American
copyright law).
248. "[A]n advantage that is to be enjoyed more than half a century after we are dead, by
somebody we know not whom, perhaps by somebody unborn, by somebody utterly unconnected
... Chafee, supra note 58, at 719 (citing 8
with us, ir really no motive at all to action.
MACAULY, WORKS (Trevelyn ed. 1879) 199-201).
249. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).
250. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 294 (statement of Professor Dennis Karjala); See
also supra text accompanying notes 126-136 (discussing how the underlying philosophical
differences between common law copyright and authors' rights countries posed a challenge to the
success of the Berne Convention).
251. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 290-91 (statement of Professor Dennis Karjala).
252. 1995 Senate Hearings,supra note 6 (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).

253. Id. (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
254.

Id. (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi).
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First, there is no data suggesting how many of the works that are
approaching the end of their terms of protection and entrance into the
public domain are truly still marketable abroad. The trade dollars that
come from selling American music abroad probably comes from
popular, newer works, not those on the verge of becoming ineligible
for copyright protection.
Second, United States copyright law currently protects certain
types of works for longer terms than the EC Duration Directive. 5 For
instance, even without the proposed extension, the U.S. copyright
owner of a sound recording will be protected for "75 years from first

publication or 100 years from creation whichever is shorter."' The
EC affords only five extra years of protection to sound recordings.'
Accordingly, in these situations where U.S. protection is greater, the
rule of the shorter term would not operate to take away this fifty-year
protection.
Third, even if the United States does extend its protection, the
EC could refuse to honor copyright protection for U.S. authors on
other grounds, such as inconsistencies between U.S. copyright law and
the minimum standards mandated by the Berne Convention, i.e.,
failure to comply with the moral rights provisions. According to
opponents of the extension, the "unequal" treatment that U.S.
copyright owners may receive in Europe is not an excuse "for
mimicking a bad European move that favors the owners of a few old,
but economically valuable, copyrights over the interests of the general
public." 219 There are also Constitutional arguments against a copyright
term of this duration, but as one scholar has noted, these
contitutionally-grounded arguments "for limitations on proprietary
rights" are being rejected time and time again.'
V
Conclusion Special interests are again at work in the promulgation of the
proposed Copyright Term Extension Act. Economic reasons do make
255. 1995 House Hearings,supra note 10, at 216 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Asst.
Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
256. Id.

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 291 (statement of Professor Dennis Karjala).
260. Jaszi, supra note 44, at 596.
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a strong case for extending copyright protection. Yet, if Congress
allows economics to dictate the future of U.S. copyright laws, then the
U.S. is not being true to the constitutional mandate regarding
copyrights. 61 The only way this extension can be justified is if the
economics of the extension promote the progress of science and the
arts. The proposed extension promotes greed as creators or their
assignees hope that an increase in copyright duration will enable them
to receive a higher price. The public will pay the price if life plus
seventy becomes the rule.

261.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

